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ABSTRACT 
The idea that due process of law is, in essence, a conversation 
between ruler and ruled underpins many legal systems. Following Lon 
Fuller, due process creates a “peculiar form of dialogue” that seeks to 
uphold the interests of those affected by decisionmakers’ actions. As 
empire’s most enduring legacy to postcolonial legal systems, due 
process of law has come to be integral to the postcolonial state’s 
purposive self-imagining in a bid for universality. Yet, despite its 
symbolic value as an instrument of “justice” in the postcolonial state, 
due process produces little actual dialogue between ruler and ruled. In 
the Global South’s rule of law promotion, due process thinking remains 
firmly anchored to its adjudicatory origins and in rationalizing formal 
domestic judicial procedure and institutions for the efficient settlement 
of prosaic claims. This Article argues that the coercive imposition of 
the rule of law in an imperial and developmental context resulted in the 
failure of due process of law to protect individuals against the 
arbitrariness of the exercise of state power. This author uses the 2012 
Access to Justice Assessment Tool: A Guide to Analyzing Access to 
Justice for Civil Society Organizations published by the American Bar 
Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) and the Rule of Law 
Index 2016 report by the World Justice Project (WJP) in considering 
this argument. The author’s purpose is to invite rethinking of due 
process, from dialogue in the courts, into one that enables resistance 
to silencing forms of imperial intervention. 
INTRODUCTION  
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE’S 
MYTH-MAKING 
he postcolonial State aspires towards the universality of the Euro-
American nation-state. This universality—“a contingent 
development that initially occurred in the West”1—articulated the 
modern law of the nation-state. Under the universalist rationality, due 
process of law serves as a fundamental protection against the state’s 
1 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the “Social Scientific” Concept of Legal Pluralism, 
20 J.L.  SOC’Y 192, 197 (1993). See generally Ruth Buchanan, Perpetual Peace or Perpetual 
Process: Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legality at the World Trade Organization, 
16 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 673–99 (2003).  
T 
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arbitrary deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, and property. Yet, 
throughout the violent imperial encounters of the sixteenth to twentieth 
centuries, the universalist rationality subsumed “parallel systems of 
justice for colonizer and colonized”2 to reproduce within the conquered 
polity a uniform, monolithic socio-legal order. The imperialist 
reconceived due process of law as access to administrative or judicial 
relief to reinforce legal-normative uniformity within the colonial 
structure. 
As imperialism fell passé, external initiatives to develop the “rule of 
law” within the nascent postcolonial state, such as those led by the 
American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) and the 
World Justice Project (WJP), gave the universalist rationality a new 
lease on life. The postcolonial state started to purposively imagine itself 
along the same, imposed rationality—a “mythmaking”3 project—that 
informs varied rituals which serve symbolic and prosaic functions. I am 
interested in the coercive imposition of the rule of law within two 
temporal contexts: first, in the age of imperialism and second, in 
contemporary rule of law promotion projects in the Global South, 
particularly in the Philippines. The focus of this Article is how the 
promise of due process of law was, and is, operationalized in both 
settings. 
In this Article, I argue that rule-of-law promotion in the Global 
South continues to tether the postcolonial state’s due process of law 
rituals to its narrow administrative-adjudicatory concept. In imperially 
received due process rituals, the state’s actions are considered fair and 
just as long as they comply with administrative-judicial procedure. As 
a legal guarantee against arbitrary deprivation, due process operates 
only in relation to having; that is, it protects against the arbitrary taking 
of something already had, be it life, liberty, property, or something else. 
With rule of law interventions in the Global South, the ritual generated 
proposes an idealized path connecting due process of law to justice, 
2 Helen Dewar, Litigating Empire: The Role of French Courts in Establishing Colonial 
Sovereignties, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500–1850 49, 50 (Lauren Benton and 
Richard J Ross, eds., 2013) [hereinafter LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES]. 
3 See Alexis Ian P. Dela Cruz, Royal Pains: Lèse majesté in an International Rights-
Based Legal Framework, 86 PHILIPPINE L.J. 948 (2012) (proposing that the state, 
postcolonial or not, engages in the deliberate writing of myths of its own choosing); see also 
Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, 50 Nomos 3, 25 (2011); 
Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in THOMAS CAROTHERS, ED., 
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 75–104 (2006). 
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without laying that path’s normative foundations.4 Lon Fuller once 
described such a path in relation to political democracy: that due 
process is essentially a peculiar dialogue between ruler and ruled, albeit 
“scarcely ever realized in practice.”5 Fuller’s thesis expresses a sense 
of promise inherent in due process of law, which rule of law promotion 
preaches in the Global South. Yet, without the quality of having, access 
to administrative-adjudicatory relief is illusory. Knowledge and access 
to procedure became essential to one’s ability to speak to power, 
rendering vast sections of society inaudible to the law and excluding 
them from the broader dialogues that shape life in general. 
This Article is divided into two sections and a conclusion. Section I 
provides a legal historical account of the privileging of the 
administrative-adjudicatory register of due process of law through 
imperialism and contemporary rule of law promotion. Section I then 
turns to the consequences of initiatives to promote the rule of law as a 
normative framework for “doing justice” in the Global South despite 
the many different contextual meanings of the rule of law. Section II 
further explores the emphasis of contemporary rule of law promotion 
projects on rationalizing judicial procedure and institutions through 
manuals and measurement tools developed by ABA ROLI and WJP. I 
conclude this Article with some tentative thoughts on how rule of law 
promotion’s normative agenda shapes broader social dialogues within 
the Global South. 
I 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW: WHICH PROCESS AND WHOSE? 
I begin this Section by examining certain registers of due process 
and the rule of law. One such register is that the rule of law is broadly 
understood as a check against the arbitrary exercise of the state’s 
power.6 Due process of law, on the other hand, performs the same 
function on a much narrower plane: between judge (an agent of the 
state) and litigant (a person subject to the court’s jurisdiction). These 
registers are prominent themes of contemporary state rituals that cast 
due process in terms of investigative fairness, notification, hearing, and 
4 Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2016). 
5 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 
(1979). 
6 Martin Krygier, Why Rule of Law Promotion Is Too Important to Be Left to Lawyers, 
in RAIMOND GAITA & GERRY SIMPSON, EDS., WHO’S AFRAID OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
133, 140 (2017). 
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the opportunity to explain one’s side.7 Legal history reveals that the 
prominence of those registers is a relatively recent development. This 
Article’s legal historical focus is the Philippines.  
Deprivation of life, liberty, and property is not to be carried out 
without following a series of steps ordered by the law.8 Framed in terms 
of deprivation, due process of law has evolved baldly into a judge’s 
assessment of facts, usually after deprivations have occurred. As the 
state carried out these deprivations summarily or wrongfully, the state 
obscured the premise and promise of due process before its co-option 
into the state’s myths and rituals. My purpose in this Article is to 
interrogate the intuition9 that due process, through its contemporary 
rituals, fails to function as a safety-valve against hasty deprivations of 
life, liberty, and property in the Global South. 
A. “Audiencia” to Courts, “Oidor” to Judge: An (Ignored) Legal
Historical Account
The beginnings of due process of law in the Philippines were
expedient. After losing its massive landholdings in the Americas in the 
1820s and 1830s, Spain pivoted its attention to its only substantial 
Asian colony.10 Madrid introduced colonial reforms to raise Spain’s 
negative or merely “protective” role in the Philippines to an aggressive 
intervention  managing the affairs of the Philippines’ population.11 One 
reform was to secure the availability of agricultural land in the colony 
for the production of food for the Metropolis.12 Reporting on the state 
of the Philippine Islands during that period, peninsular historian Tomás 
7 See Vivo v. Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corp., G.R. No. 187854, 707 S.C.R.A. 
276 (Nov. 12, 2013) (Phil.). 
8 Const. (1987), art. III § 1 (Phil.). 
9 See Maks del Mar, Beyond Universality and Particularity, Necessity and Contingency: 
On Collaboration Between Legal Theory and Legal History, in LAW IN THEORY AND 
HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 22, 23 (Maksymilian del Mar & 
Michael Lobban, eds., 2016). 
10 See generally Ma Dolores Elizalde, Imperio, Negocios, Raza y Nación: Impresiones 
Internacionales de Filipinas a Fines del Siglo XIX [Empire, Business, Race, and Nation: 
International Perspectives of the Philippines at the End of the 19th Century], in MA DOLORES 
ELIZALDE, ET AL., EDS., IMPERIOS Y NACIONES EN EL PACÍFICO, VOLUMEN I, LA 
FORMACIÓN DE UNA COLONIA: FILIPINAS [Empires and Nations in the Pacific, Volume I, 
The Formation of a Colony: The Philippines] 441–85 (Author trans., Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 2001).   
11 JOHN D. BLANCO, FRONTIER CONSTITUTIONS: CHRISTIANITY AND COLONIAL 
EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILIPPINES 42 (2009). 
12 Id. 
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de Comyn called for the acceleration of general culture that would meet 
Spanish agricultural needs.13  
The culture that Comyn alluded to was that of the natives, and the 
“acceleration” of this culture was undertaken by indio families 
committed to colonial reform.14 The framing of colonial reform as 
cultural awareness was purposively redirected toward the creation of 
new needs amongst the natives—a new culture of capitalism—to 
sustain Spanish sovereignty in the Islands.15 To this end, Comyn 
cautioned Madrid that its maternal pivot to the Islands might raise the 
natives’ suspicion, and recommended Madrid ensure that the rights of 
the indio would be respected from the start of the reforms.16 This 
episode of reforms gave rise to an early, albeit rudimentary, notion of 
due process of law in the Philippines. From Comyn’s estado (state) 
project, due process has been an important narrative to the rationality17 
that would eventually become the Philippine state. These reforms, 
however, proved far too late to reinvigorate Spanish power in the 
Philippines. In 1898, Spain transferred sovereignty over the 
Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico to the United States at the 
conclusion of the Spanish-American War.18 
In 1900, U.S. President William McKinley charged William H. Taft, 
head of the Second Philippine Commission (“Taft Commission”) and 
future U.S. president, with the responsibility to impose upon the Islands 
“the inviolable rule that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.”19 The purpose was to ensure that 
in the colony, the rule followed “a narrow, undeviating path” of 
application and interpretation.20 The long-time Spanish colony, 
unschooled in (Anglo-American) law, was expected to follow the new 
sovereign’s ways. But operationally, due process of law was to serve 
an essentially superintendent, rather than protective, function. It would 
pave the transpacific procedural corridor that led to the U.S. Supreme 
13 TOMÁS DE COMYN, ESTADO DE LAS ISLAS FILIPINAS EN 1810 [State of the Philippine 
Islands in 1810] 30–31 (Author trans., Imprenta de Repullés, 1820).  
14 Id. at 30. 
15 BLANCO, supra note 11, at 44.  
16 COMYN, supra note 13, at 30.  
17 See BLANCO, supra note 11, at 9.  
18 Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, 
U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, T.S. No. 343 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
19 Pacifico A. Agabin, Laissez Faire and the Due Process Clause: How Economic
Ideology Affects Constitutional Development, 44 PHIL. L.J. 709, 715 (1969). 
20 Id. 
2019] Due Process of Law as Resistance: Dialogue,  341 
Empire and Rule of Law Promotion in the Philippines 
Court as the final court of appeals from all judgments of the Insular 
Supreme Court.21  
The United States’ imposition of the due process principles in the 
Philippines contrasts sharply with the history of due process in the 
United States. This invites the question: “Why is Anglo-American 
Jurisprudence Unhistorical?”22 And yet, the invocation in the American 
Declaration of Independence of “the inalienable right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness” is actually a confluence of at least four 
historical streams of thought: 
[F]irst, the seventeenth century Whig fundamental law tradition
derived either from immemorial custom or from an ancient
constitution existing before the Norman invasion; second, Thomistic
natural law, whose content consisted primarily of specifying a
person’s social duties in an organic community; third, the
seventeenth century social contractarian conception of natural rights
existing in a state of nature and exercised by atomistic individuals
against the State [and]; [fourth], a conception of rights in which
Newtonian scientific laws were gradually transformed into Kantian
moral laws.23
At the foundational moment of the United States, a notion of due 
process was articulated through a rich dialogue steeped in various 
historical traditions. Although birthed in opposition to English 
colonialism within a revolutionary setting, U.S. due process of law was 
not originally conceived as a matter of rigid procedure, quite contrary 
to when President McKinley ordered its imposition in the Philippines. 
Centuries after that foundational moment, American imperial efforts 
severed due process from its historical roots of resistance against the 
abuses of colonial power.  
The prominence of procedural due process in the making of the 
Philippine State is an imperial effort legacy. After 1898, all things 
Spanish were systematically demonized in the Islands.24 This was 
accomplished by portraying the new sovereign as a nurturing father to 
the poor “Orphans of the Pacific,” abandoned by Spain and vulnerable 
to the depredations of other European powers that held sway elsewhere 
21 Id. at 716. 
22 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence 
Unhistorical?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 551–86 (1997).  
23 Id. at 553. 
24 See Gloria Cano, Blair and Robertson’s The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898: 
Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda?, 56 PHIL. STUD. 1, 3–46 (2008). 
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in Asia.25 “American fathering” would educate the backward Oriental 
“daughter republic” in self-government through the establishment of an 
English-language educational system by 1903.26 The Spanish colonial 
judiciary, with its audiencias, would be replaced by the American court 
of law: the oidor, by the judge. Both Spanish terms, with roots from the 
Latin audire, “to hear,” would become outmoded at the dawning of a 
new American order in the Philippines.  
This phasing out was not merely a matter of labels. Removing 
references to hearing subtly reconceived due process of law into a 
process that sought merely not to deprive a person of her life, liberty, 
or property. Dialogue between the state and the individual was recast 
with a basis focused on having, guided by procedure, and open only to 
those who had the wherewithal to present their grievances to the 
jurisdiction of a court. The colonizing state, with the rationality it 
sought to reproduce in what eventually became the postcolonial state, 
mythologized justice behind the enigmatic shroud of procedure. The 
mooring of the act of listening to administrative-judicial procedure 
became central in telling a new myth dominated by the captivating 
narrative of “preparing” Filipinos for the responsibilities of 
sovereignty. The underlying message was that unless the Filipino 
learned the imperially-imposed procedure, his or her voice would 
essentially be inaudible to the sovereign. At the formal end of U.S. 
sovereignty over the Philippines in July 1946, the due process myth 
was complete and impenetrable; it was a received narrative that 
foreclosed dialogue between ruler and ruled in favor of dialogue 
between judge and litigant.  
At the heart of American fathering was an aggressive, colonial 
policing infrastructure designed to pacify what remained of the Filipino 
resistance against the transfer of sovereignty.27 Due process, or 
substantive due process from the American common law, was 
construed as the basis of judicially sanctioned policing to entrench the 
new sovereign but not as a mantle affording Filipinos the protection of 
the U.S. constitutional relation linking states and territories to the 
25 Reynaldo C. Ileto, Mother Spain, Uncle Sam, and the Construction of Filipino 
National Identity, in IMPERIOS Y NACIONES EN EL PACÍFICO, VOLUMEN I, LA FORMACIÓN 
DE UNA COLONIA: FILIPINAS [EMPIRES AND NATIONS IN THE PACIFIC, VOLUME I, THE 
FORMATION OF A COLONY: THE PHILIPPINES] 119, 124 (Ma Dolores Elizalde et al. eds., 
2001). 
26 Id. at 126. 
27 ALFRED W. MCCOY, POLICING AMERICA’S EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES, THE 
PHILIPPINES, AND THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE STATE 61 (2009). 
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federal government.28 Because the Filipinos did not have the status of 
U.S. citizens, the Filipino being was not accorded the full extent of due 
process protections. Due process did little to prevent deprivation of 
Filipino lives, liberties, and properties in the years following the 
transfer of sovereignty. 
President McKinley’s instructions to the Taft Commission reflect 
what H.L. A. Hart observed as the American obsession “with what 
courts do and should do.”29 Due process was to be inviolable, a self-
evident truth. Its imposition on the Philippine Islands was not 
undermined by normative debates or historical introspection on its 
meaning. The sovereign ordains a procedure; regardless of the 
consequent outcome, the outcome is deemed lawful as long as lawyer, 
litigant, and judge all comply faithfully with procedure.30 As due 
process conflates the individual’s state of being (citizenship, race, 
social affiliation) with the condition of having (rights associated with 
being citizens, economic resources), it justifies whatever the sovereign 
might do with being. Yet, being and having have aspects that are hardly 
the exclusive domain of the law of the nation-state. Therefore, “no 
single institution either fully determines or fully controls all of the 
issues that surround these two important societal assets.”31  
The disjuncture between due process’ eighteenth century American 
revolutionary roots and due process’ early twentieth century imposition 
in the Philippines becomes even more problematic in the context of 
English legal history, from which the nascent United States sought 
much guidance. The events surrounding the genesis of the writ of 
habeas corpus in English law, for instance, instructed how to 
conceptualize due process of law as a dialogue outside the courts. After 
a political crisis in the late 1620s between King Charles I and the 
English Parliament involving the legality of detaining persons by royal 
prerogative,32 it became widely understood that deprivations of liberty 
28 United States v. Bull, G.R. No. L-5270, 15 Phil. 7, 27 (Jan. 15, 1910). 
29 H.L. A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). 
30 Jonathan Gorman, Legal Consciousness: A Metahistory, in LAW IN THEORY AND 
HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 84, 106 (Maksymilian del Mar & 
Michael Lobban eds., 2016). 
31 Christian Lund, Access to Property and Citizenship: Marginalization in a Context of 
Legal Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND 
PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 197 (Brian Z. Tamanaha et al. eds., 2012). 
32 See BRIAN R. FARRELL, HABEAS CORPUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–21 (2016). 
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may no longer be carried out without parliamentary fiat. Parliament 
then passed acts prohibiting arbitrary imprisonment by the king.33  
Initially, any seeming relationship between law and justice was not 
inextricably connected with procedure prescribed by and from a mighty 
state. In a setting where legality and the state were both in a condition 
of flux, dialogue enabled English society to acknowledge the horrors 
of, and later articulate legal limits to, the sovereign’s plenary power of 
detention. After broad social dialogues determined the content and 
limits of arbitrary detention law, judges became responsible for 
developing “a writ of majestic, even equitable sweep that made it 
possible to protect the king’s subjects.”34 Through broad collective 
dialogue against the abuses of the king, liberty (from arbitrary 
detention) became an important aspect of one’s participation (being) in 
the English polity.  
Habeas corpus was born from centuries of dialogue between ruler 
and ruled. The organization of public powers along an ordinary-
absolute binary in medieval Europe35 allowed the public dispensation 
of equitable measures that were not necessarily tied to the black letter 
of the law. Due process of law was a contestation that allowed society 
to make sense of its habits and to question whether any of them were 
actually unnecessary or harmful rituals “without clear purpose, 
needless precautions preserved through habit.”36 Yet, from seventeenth 
century England to the late nineteenth century transfer of sovereignty 
over the Philippines, due process mutated into something else—a 
mechanism that foreclosed dialogue. 
Through imperial subjugation, the making of habeas corpus by 
unelected judges has transformed due process of law in the Global 
South into a doctrine entrenched per legem terrae (by “the law of the 
land”) that “presuppose[s] a national judiciary in a national state.”37 
Judges thus gained a vital voice in the portrayal of the “majesty” of the 
postcolonial “nation-state.” 
Judicial control was thus conceived as a safeguard against an 
otherwise unlimited power. As government largesse grew, and 
33 Id. at 21.  
34 PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 9 (2010).  
35 Ian Williams, Developing a Prerogative Theory for the Authority of the Chancery: 
The French Connection, in LAW AND AUTHORITY IN BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY, 1200–1900 
33, 37–38 (Mark Godfrey ed., 2016). 
36 Fuller, supra note 5, at 356. 
37 CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 81 (2006).  
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relationships between citizens and the state proliferated, this approach 
was extended to dominium.38 
Transplanted to the Global South, a new myth was founded upon the 
assumed superiority of the law of the land39 over other systems of 
normative ordering and thinking. The imperial purpose was to 
reconfigure conquered polities into the nation-state and to re-imagine 
being as having in the delineation of the individual’s legal protections. 
For as long as something had is not arbitrarily taken away by the state, 
the legal dimensions of being are of secondary importance. From legal-
institutional myths received from the colonizer, administrative-judicial 
procedure would supplant the acts of speaking and listening between 
the ruler and the ruled with the non-deprivation of individual life, 
liberty, and property becoming subordinate to “the common good” and 
the broad agenda of the nation-state.40 Rules in society would recede in 
favor of “the rule of law” as the dominant narrative of the postcolonial 
state’s rituals.  
From the English political crises that gave rise to habeas corpus, to 
the American Revolution’s construction of the promises and guarantees 
of due process of law, it seems far-fetched to expect due process to 
create the “narrow, undeviating path”41 to justice envisaged in 
President McKinley’s instructions of the Taft Commission. Across the 
Global South, the imperial encounter violently suppressed indigenous 
systems of fluid institutions and legalities from having the dialogues 
that allowed the English and American polities to acknowledge and 
address their social ills. At the end of the imperial encounter, conquered 
polities were rebuilt on the foundations of a received rule of law order. 
This time, however, reconstruction was carried out, not by brute 
subjugation, but with something more “polite,” promoting the rule of 
law in the Global South. 
B. An Impolite Order
Ian Duncanson proposes politeness as the basis of constructing 
social order in the similarly etymologically-derived polis and polity. 
38 GIACINTO DELLA CANANEA, DUE PROCESS OF LAW BEYOND THE STATE 18 (2016). 
39 STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, THEATRE OF THE RULE OF LAW: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
INTERVENTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 33 (2010). 
40 ANTHONY GREGORY, THE POWER OF HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: FROM THE 
KING’S PREROGATIVE TO THE WAR ON TERROR 312–13 (2013). 
41 Agabin, supra note 19, at 715. 
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He describes politeness as an enabler of conversation that leads to the 
formation of a “common enterprise by virtue of perhaps implicit 
understandings born of familiarity and long practice of cooperation.”42 
To him, while politeness constituted the foundation of the early English 
transatlantic polity, it failed to prevent the subsequent rise of a model 
of empire based on domination and maintained through a fixation with 
the uniformity of rules.43  
In this spirit of (im)politeness, I examine contemporary rule of law 
promotion in the Philippines and in the Global South as a lingering 
successor to that imperial fixation in this subsection. Here, I 
acknowledge the fierce theoretical contestations over the meaning of 
the rule of law. Even rule of law promoters admit the feeling of not 
knowing precisely what they ought to know as a result of their 
engagement in these promotion projects around the world.44 Shorn of 
the disagreements over its meaning, the rule of law is a specific legality 
that seeks principally to constrain the personal arbitrariness of those 
who rule.45  
The above proposition is made in response to rule of law 
promotion’s tendency to conflate due process of law with the rule of 
law in a bid to “do justice.” To the extent that legality aspires to a de-
personalized ordering, rule of law promoters superimpose legality’s 
ideals of uniformity, linearity, predictability, and sequence upon the 
outcomes of judicial processes. These ideals were central to Western 
rule of law rhetoric that gained prominence in the early days of the Cold 
War.46 Notably, the American Bar Association (ABA) enlisted lawyers 
to minister the U.S.-led mission of proselytizing the decolonizing 
world in the ways of the rule of law and democracy against 
communism: 
42 Ian Duncanson, Law as Conversation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 57, 
79 (Anne Orford ed., 2006) (citations omitted).  
43 Id. at 83–84. 
44 Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 8 
(Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003).  
45 Barry R. Weingast, Why Developing Countries Prove So Resistant to the Rule of Law, 
in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 28, 38 (James J. Heckman et al. eds., 
2010). 
46 LAURA GRENFELL, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-CONFLICT STATES 18 
(2013).  
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And what is the role of lawyers in the rule of law? Lawyers are the 
handmaidens of justice [and] the technicians of democracy.47  
The rule of law and development movement was thus dealt a new 
lease on life as imperialism grew moribund internationally. To the 
postcolonial state, this meant receiving billions of dollars in 
international aid for security sector construction, professionalizing the 
civil service, and developing national police forces.48 To precolonial 
legal systems, this meant the erosion and abolition of the postcolonial 
state.49 Today, rule of law promotion forms an important aspect of 
bilateral and multilateral assistance initiatives to “support democratic 
reform, encourage better governance, further economic development 
and prosperity through different strategies and interventions.”50  
As “standard, central, and pricey elements of international aid to 
countries thought to need economic development . . . and many other 
good things,”51 rule of law promotion is a growing sector led mostly by 
lawyers from the Global North. Rule of law promotion actively shapes 
the mythology of the postcolonial state: the rule of law is the central 
narrative in the institutional vacuum created by the departing colonial 
power. Here, received legal ideals are deliberately presented as superior 
to the rule of men.52 Due process of law is thus conceptualized as a 
series of steps in positive law which assumes pure legal categories “that 
fix in advance the meaning of the legal terms independently of concrete 
facts . . . in accordance with rules of strict logic.”53 The question of 
fairness of legal outcomes emerges as a function of the “majesty of the 
law” with the reconfigured myth largely silent on the accountability of 
the human institutions that caused these outcomes. Thus, for example, 
sovereign immunity as a rule of law is an entrenched legal fiction that 
“goes to great lengths to immunise states from suits, even when the 
violation of the rule of law is undisputed.”54 
47 Ross L. Malone, Promoting the Rule of Law: The Role of the American Lawyer, 45 
A.B.A. J. 242, 243 (1959). 
48 LaKindra Mohr, Lessons Learned: An Analysis of Recent Rule-of-Law Reform Efforts 
in Haiti, 16 J. HAITIAN STUD. 148, 149 (2010). 
49 GRENFELL, supra note 46, at 21. 
50 Lelia Mooney et al., Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: A Conversation on Its 
Evolution, Setbacks, and Future Challenges, 44 INT’L. LAW. 837, 838 (2010). 
51 Krygier, supra note 6, at 133. 
52 Waldron, supra note 3, at 25.  
53 LUC B. TREMBLAY, THE RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND INTERPRETATION 157 (1997). 
54 Adam Shinar, One Rule to Rule Them All? Rules of Law against the Rule of Law, 5 
Theory & Prac. Legis. 149, 165 (2017). 
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To be sure, rule of law ideals notionally hold the promise that the 
courts would not act arbitrarily. Such ideals formally ensure judicial 
affirmation of the state’s commitment to not arbitrarily deprive 
communities or individuals of life, liberty, and property. In contrast, 
however, communities and individuals in the Global South often find 
themselves unable to turn to this promise at the precise moment when 
the deprivations occur.  
For example, the argument that the rule of law is plainly a matter of 
compliance with due process flies in the face of a state’s failure to 
account for the legal protections of the poor against social exclusion 
and spatial segregation in Brazilian cities.55 Although the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988 reaffirms both the right to private property56 and 
requires the use of property to meet its social and environmental 
functions,57 traditional conceptions of property and land use favorable 
to elites and property speculators remain firmly entrenched.58 Hence, 
in this specific scenario, any legal reform that rule of law promoters 
might undertake in addressing social exclusion in the cities of the 
Global South must be informed with critical discussions on the role of 
law in the urbanization process.59 Yet, privileging rule of law ideals 
diminishes due process of law into the judicial determination of 
whether the state’s power to perform certain acts existed in law, instead 
of protecting individuals against the potential harshness of state 
action.60 Arguably, such discussions must take us into a reassessment 
of the exalted position the courts occupy when refereeing the dialogue 
between ruler and ruled.  
Thus, the conflation of due process of law with the rule of law in 
projects promoting the rule of law is hardly surprising. After all, the 
flexibility of its close cousin—legal procedure—propped up the rule of 
law in colonial regimes.61 The Washington-based World Justice Project 
(WJP), for instance, identifies “access to justice” as one of the rule of 
55 Edésio Fernandes, Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 201, 210 (2007). 
56 CONSTITUIÇÂO FEDERAL [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1998, art. 5 ¶ XXII (Brazil) 
(Author trans.). 
57 Id. at art. 5 ¶ XXIII. 
58 Alan M. White, Market Price, Social Price, and the Right to the City: Land Taxes and 
Rates for City Services in Brazil and the United States, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
313, 319 (2013). 
59 Id. at 208. 
60 DELLA CANANEA, supra note 38, at 146.  
61 NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 66 (2003). 
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law’s fundamental aspects.62 In practice, WJP measures access to 
justice in terms of timely justice delivery “by competent, ethical, and 
independent representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, 
have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities 
they serve.”63 Access to justice is framed largely as an issue of adequate 
legal practitioners. With generally high numbers of lawyers and judges 
per capita, many of the countries from which most rule of law programs 
originate have substantively developed structures that ensure and 
encourage access to the courts. But in the Global South, a growing 
number of legal professionals is hardly responsive to entrenched legal, 
economic, physical, and psychological barriers to justice.64 The result 
is that justice remains inaccessible to vulnerable sections of the 
population.65 
More recently, rule of law promotion, especially from the United 
States, faces the irony of sustaining its Cold War-era proselytizing 
impulse abroad at a time of national economic slowdown.66 In the early 
days of the United Nations, discussions on the leadership role of the 
United States in building “international society” through its “civilising 
influence” did not address issues of the “extension of the realm of Law” 
as a tool for economic development.67 This raises questions of why, 
assuming that the rule of law brings about economic development, the 
impacts of that proselytizing impulse could still be felt even after a 
series of economic downturns in the Global North. A suggested 
response is that the persistence of normative value of the rule of law is 
because it is a “usable grammar that has come to transgress [national] 
borders.”68  
62 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, Rule of Law Index 2016, 9 (2016), https://worldjustice 
project.org [hereinafter WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT]. 
63 Id. 
64 Jessica Vapnek, Peter Boaz & Helga Turku, Improving Access to Justice in 
Developing and Post-Conflict Countries: Practical Examples from the Field, 8 DUKE F. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 27, 39–43 (2016).  
65 Id. at 39. 
66 Richard A. Epstein, The Legacy of Progressive Thought: Decline, Not Death, by a 
Thousand Cuts, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 435, 467 (F.H. 
Buckley ed., 2013). 
67 MARK MAZOWER, NO ENCHANTED PALACE: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 101 (2009). 
68 Gianluigi Palombella, Global Threads: Weaving the Rule of Law and the Balance of 
Legal Software, in FILIPPO FONTANELLI ET AL., SHAPING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH 
DIALOGUE: INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL EXPERIENCES 415, 425 (2010). 
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Yet, when we recall the emergence of habeas corpus as a dialogue 
between and amongst members of an English “state” still in a condition 
of flux, no external grammar orchestrated the conversation. Whether 
the contemporary postcolonial state is similarly in a condition of flux 
that may be stabilized through rule of law promotion remains to be 
seen. What is clear, however, is that from rule of law promotion, to the 
imperialist’s reproduction of his own myths and rituals for the “benefit” 
of the unschooled people of the Global South, the ordering that emerges 
is neither polite nor resembles the making of the polis. Participation (or 
being) in the polis is held captive by having as the organizing logic of 
the colonially received due process narrative.69 In the absence of 
having, due process of law offers being no dialogue, much less 
resistance, to the state. 
II 
MANUALS AND MEASURES: ACCESS WITHOUT INCLUSION? 
Efforts to conceptualize the rule of law in the past labored under its 
elusiveness. This elusiveness has not discouraged various institutions 
from pouring vast resources toward rule of law promotion in the Global 
South. The 1980s and 1990s saw rule of law promotion turn to 
“inclusivity” that emphasized “substantive outcomes, not just 
procedural norms.”70 However, this turn failed (and continues to fail) 
to consider that most rule of law promotion programs are based on 
open-access legal frameworks that foster competitive entry into 
political and economic organization—features which are absent in 
most Global South legal systems.71 “Inclusivity” is thus conceived as 
access to justice, judicial procedural soundness, and lawyer trainings. 
This Section challenges that conception of inclusivity by framing 
contemporary rule of law promotion as an extension of imperial due 
process. Here, I examine the tools devised by the ABA ROLI and WJP, 
respectively the Access to Justice Assessment Tool: A Guide to 
Analyzing Access to Justice for Civil Society Organizations (AJAT)72 
and the Rule of Law Index 2016.73 
69 See Lund, supra note 31, at 209. 
70 Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, in JAMES J. HECKMAN, ROBERT L. 
NELSON & LEE CABATINGAN, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 17, 21 (2010). 
71 Weingast, supra note 45, at 33. 
72 Access to Justice Assessment Tool: A Guide to Analyzing Access to Justice for Civil 
Society Organizations, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE (American 
Bar Association), 2012. [hereinafter AJAT] 
73 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 62. 
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A. ABA ROLI and Its Access to Justice Assessment Tool
The AJAT is a manual developed by the ABA ROLI “to make the 
work of those who aim to improve access to justice more effective.”74 
ABA ROLI is a recognized leader in the international rule of law 
development space and is engaged in projects in over ninety countries 
targeted to enhance individuals’ ability to access justice.75 It started in 
1991 as the Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI) in 
Sofia, Bulgaria76 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. CEELI 
placed pro bono American lawyers to provide one-on-one assistance to 
governments, the bar, or others in the justice sector. One of CEELI’s 
guiding principles is a commitment to “providing ‘thought leadership’ 
in the field of rule of law promotion.”77 
In 1998, the ABA expanded its work to Asia through the 
establishment of its Asia Law Initiative (ALI) with support from the 
Ford Foundation. Taking advantage of the ABA’s connections within 
the Asian legal community, ALI immediately developed technical 
assistance programs to explore public interest law litigation in China, 
Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the early 2000s, CEELI’s 
model of engaging pro bono attorneys proved unsuitable to the 
professionalizing technical legal assistance sector. This led to the 2007 
merger of its five regional programs (Central Europe, Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa) into 
ABA ROLI.78 ABA ROLI has since been a non-profit program 
“grounded in the belief that rule of law promotion is the most effective 
long-term antidote to the pressing problems facing the world today, 
including poverty, conflict, endemic corruption, and disregard for 
human rights.”79 Specifically, ABA ROLI’s program in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo was celebrated as “a striking example of how 
74 AJAT, supra note 72, at vii. 
75 Jennifer Rasmussen, A Short History of the American Bar Association Rule of Law 
Initiative’s Technical Assistance Approach, 31 WIS. INT’L. L.J. 776, 784 (2014). 
76 Id. at 777. 
77 Id. at 778. 
78 Id. at 779. 
79 Al Amado, The American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative Projects in Ecuador: 
Moving Toward Comprehensive Reform of the Criminal Justice System and Cross-Border 
Ties with the United States, 18 CURRENTS IN INT’L. TRADE L.J. 26 (2010). 
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much [ABA ROLI’s] assistance programs have grown to respond to 
the special needs and circumstances of various regions.”80 
The AJAT was drafted to adapt the rule of law to the needs of local 
communities. Two principal beliefs animated its preparation: first, that 
reliable research identifying problem areas is key to the success of 
access to justice programs, and second, that local organizations must 
play a lead role in the development and implementation of such 
programs within their own communities.81 Its definition of access to 
justice is a two-pronged condition where “citizens are able to use 
justice institutions to obtain solutions to their common justice 
problems” and where “justice institutions . . . function effectively to 
provide fair solutions to citizens’ justice problems.”82 Written mostly 
in the second-person voice, AJAT speaks to civil society organizations 
on access to justice elements, to be explored through three questions 
concerning (1) the extent of the presence of each element in the justice 
system, (2) the factors affecting the extent of that presence, and (3) 
possible reform strategies.83 
For example, AJAT’s section on Legal Framework takes a “back-to-
basics” approach in the assessment of “state laws,” “formal justice 
systems,” “non-state laws,” and “non-state justice systems” (NSJS).84 
This approach notionally accommodates a plurality of customary 
systems of justice into the formal state justice framework. Upon a 
closer look, however, AJAT envisions a legal framework in which 
NSJS decisionmakers must develop “a range of skills and knowledge” 
to “improve the quality of decision-making through non-state [justice] 
systems.”85 Although sensible, scholar Julio Faundez argues that such 
recommendations “are too general to provide a clear guide for 
action.”86 Recommendations to build capacity amongst NSJS 
decisionmakers assume that no such capacity exists, or that any such 
capacity may only be assessed in terms of a state justice framework. 
Thus, insofar as AJAT seeks to empower civil society organizations in 
80 James R Silkenat, The American Bar Association and the Rule of Law, 67 SMU L. 
REV. 745, 757 (2014). 
81 AJAT, supra note 72, at vii. 
82 Id. at 1. 
83 Id. at 3. 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 Id. at 6. 
86 Julio Faundez, Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies: State 
Building or Legal Reform, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND 
PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 177, 178 (Brian Z. Tamanaha  et al. eds., 2012).  
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crafting local access to justice programs in their communities, it 
appears that a favorable assessment of NSJS lies in close coordination 
and cooperation with state authorities.87  
Following Faundez’s analysis, the rule of law sector’s conflation of 
legal reform with state building allows us to examine AJAT as a 
contemporary iteration of colonial methodologies directed towards the 
making of the modern state. AJAT’s framing of access to justice 
assessment as a set of research guidelines uncannily resonates with the 
American imperial information gathering effort of the past. It bears the 
imprint of the Monroan project of “Pan-American sameness” peddled 
by the U.S. rule of law missions to South America in the 1910s.88 If the 
state’s object is to render intricate social fabrics legible through a 
standardized administrative handbook, then “U.S. imperial rule was 
unrivalled in its ability to ‘read’ alien terrains through such surface 
reconnaissance.”89 Within the first decade of U.S. rule in the 
Philippines, the colonial bureaucracy had already produced several 
practical compendia on almost everything the Americans needed to 
know about their new possession: from a list of commercial timbers, to 
the specifics of the sugar industry, even to a pronunciation guide for 
local place names.90 Information gathering was a potent tool of 
coercion central to the making of the postcolonial state.91 In 
contemporary rule of law promotion, information gathering plays an 
important role in ensuring uniformity, predictability, and stability 
within state legal systems. 
Arguably, then, assessing and framing access to justice as state 
building will continue to portray NSJSs as non-, or other than, the state. 
While AJAT, on its face, endeavors to open access to justice through 
NSJSs, the latter’s contradistinctive labeling against the state justice 
framework creates the risk of upsetting finely tuned governance 
arrangements that do not necessarily correspond to orthodox legal, 
political, or economic theory.92 What coercion did for the colonial order 
is what NSJS “capacity-building” is doing for contemporary rule of law 
promotion. 
87 Id. at 178–79. 
88 See JUAN PABLO SCARFI, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
AMERICAS: EMPIRE AND LEGAL NETWORKS 1–30 (2017). 
89 MCCOY, supra note 27, at 45 (citations omitted). 
90 Id. at 44. 
91 Id. at 47. 
92 See Faundez, supra note 86, at 192. 
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Some have downplayed the role of the “political economy of barriers 
to access to justice” in rule of law promotion’s sociocultural turn.93  
But, this downplay conveniently brushes aside rule of law promotion’s 
complicity with the state in maintaining barriers to dialogue between 
ruler and ruled. If the rule of law means the rule of state law, then rule 
of law promotion is partly responsible for excluding those whose 
notions of law and legality do not correspond with the structures of the 
state. If a manual’s improved responsiveness to local community needs 
is any cause for celebration, it is definitely not for bringing about 
inclusion. 
B. WJP and its Rule of Law Index
The WJP is “an independent, multidisciplinary organization 
working to advance the rule of law around the world.”94 In 2006, 
Former ABA president William Neukom founded WJP under the 
principles that “1) the rule of law is the foundation of communities of 
peace, opportunity, and equity, and 2) multidisciplinary collaboration 
is the most effective way to advance the rule of law.”95 The WJP’s 
institutional supporters include: the Ford Foundation, PepsiCo, Apple, 
Microsoft Corporation, Irish Aid, the Singapore Ministry of Law, and 
the U.S. Department of State, among others.96 At WJP’s foundation, 
Neukom announced the creation of an environment in which ideas and 
contributions to the rule of law are judged on their merits: one which 
aspired to define the rule of law “beyond the thin description of 
procedural law.”97 Since WJP’s 2008 inaugural World Justice Forum 
in Vienna, Austria, the WJP has focused on the analysis of various 
factors that contribute to successful rule of law societies.98 
In 2008, WJP began developing the Rule of Law Index, “a 
quantitative tool to assess not only de jure but also de facto government 
adherence to the rule of law.”99 The Index serves a dual function as a 
93 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 277 (2008). 
94 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 62, at 202. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 203.  
97 Silkenat, supra note 80, at 757. 
98 Id. at 758. 
99 Wolfgang Merkel, Measuring the Quality of Rule of Law: Virtues, Perils, Results, in 
RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 21, 44 (Michael Zürn et al. eds., 2012). 
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measurement device and a roadmap for targeted rule of law reforms.100 
One of WJP’s four universal rule of law principles is the timely 
delivery of justice “by competent, ethical, and independent 
representatives and neutrals . . . of sufficient number [and 
representative] of the communities they serve.”101 This is also 
known as “access to justice.”102 The international community has 
broadly certified these principles, leading some to assert their 
universality.103 
The Index measures nine rule of law factors, which are further 
disaggregated into forty-seven specific sub-factors. Specifically, Factor 
Seven measures several aspects of civil justice systems, such as access 
and affordability, non-discrimination, absence of corruption, and 
freedom from improper government influence. Factor Nine, on the 
other hand, measures informal justice mechanisms on timeliness, 
effectiveness, impartiality, and protection of fundamental rights.104 
Factor Nine also measures the effectiveness of “traditional, communal, 
tribal, and religious courts.”105 The WJP describes the Index as being 
“culturally competent” and applicable to countries of “vastly different 
social, cultural, economic, and political systems.”106 
Wolfgang Merkel identifies two main issues with the Index: (1) as a 
relatively young measuring tool, it does not provide long time-series 
data and a systematic sample of many countries; and (2) it lacks both 
theoretical justifications of the concept and aggregation rules.107 
Moreover, he cautions against the possibility that an expert’s 
knowledge of de facto rule of law is based mainly on public perceptions 
from a country’s metropolitan regions.108 Assertions of cultural 
competence and broad international certification of “universal” 
principles of the rule of law may raise theoretical questions, but 
certainly not before they raise the question of who made those 
certifications. The Index’s duality as a measuring tool and roadmap for 
100 Id. 
101 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 62, at 9.  
102 Id. 
103 See Mark Agrast commentary in V. K. Rajah, Panel Discussion: Measuring the Rule 
of Law, SING. J. LEG. STUD. 331, 334 (2012). 
104 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 62, at 13. 
105 Rajah, supra note 103, at 335. 
106 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 62, at 13. 
107 Merkel, supra note 99, at 47. 
108 Id. at 46. 
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targeted reform equips it with a voice that, yet again, redirects the due 
process dialogue from judge and litigant to “indicator developer” and 
the postcolonial state. 
Dominant indicators influence state decisionmakers to follow the 
WJP model of the rule of law and transform the governance of societies 
in ways intended to fit specific metrics of performance.109 With its 
claim of cultural competence, the Index recognizes the diversity of the 
world’s societies, but it also speaks of building and renewing 
structures, institutions, and norms as every nation’s “perpetual 
challenge.”110 Framed as a perpetual challenge, the rule of law is 
underpinned by a legitimating historicism that portrays the post-
historical” West to the still-historical rest of the world.111 
At the same time, with its putatively universal principles of the rule 
of law, the Index produces an annual global ranking of states in which 
laggards may, presumably, look to top-notchers. This ranking 
eloquently manifests the Index’s normative agenda. Where WJP puts 
forward a contestable definition of the rule of law, the Index is one more 
proposal in the debate and competes with other indicator developers’ 
proposals. However, if the Index is permanent and consistent enough, 
it ceases to be simply one more voice in the debate. Instead, the Index 
influences the other participants’ expectations of the rule of law 
community of practice, and elements of the WJP’s proposal become a 
benchmark against which other possible answers are measured.112 
The normative function of rule of law measurement has also shown 
a disciplinary effect on rule-of-law-poor states. In Romania, for 
instance, rule of law indicators are seen as potential instruments of 
governance that “can promote transparency . . . increase efficiency, 
help ‘fix governance’ problems, and act as disciplinary mechanisms” 
in Romania’s bid for admission to the European Union.113 By blurring 
109 See Kevin E. Davis et al., The Local-Global Life of Indicators: Law, Power, and 
Resistance, in THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, 
CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW 1, 21 (Sally Engle Merry et al. eds., 2015). 
110 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 62, at 13. 
111 SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 188–89 (2011). 
112 René Urueña, Indicators and the Law: A Case Study of the Rule of Law Index, in THE 
QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF 
LAW 75, 93 (Sally Engle Merry et al. eds., 2015). 
113 Mihaela Serban, Rule of Law Indicators as a Technology of Power in Romania, in 
THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE 
OF LAW 199, 213 (Sally Engle Merry et al. eds., 2015). 
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the line dividing the normal and the normative, indicators pressure their 
targets to shape up according to “common” standards.114 
To the extent that its measurement tool and roadmap duality 
advances a normative agenda, the Index’s broad conceptualization of 
the rule of law is rather impoverished in terms of due process of law. I 
do not, however, suggest that the Index engage in a wholesale 
aggregation of the various registers of due process in measuring the 
rule of law. As mentioned above, due process and the rule of law are 
conceptually distinct. Yet, despite the distinction, the Index considers 
some very specific notions of due process in Factors Seven and Nine. 
Aside from measurement errors that arise from this conceptual 
conflation,115 the Index’s growing influence116 is strategically posed to 
authorize further rule of law interventions in Global South legal 
systems that do not necessarily reflect or realize the avowed ideals of 
the rule of law. 
Some have lauded the Index’s assessment of outcomes like “civil 
justice” and “informal justice” for departing from rule of law 
literature’s traditional focus on specific actors, like courts and 
lawyers.117 Others have argued that the success or failure of indicators 
rests upon those who use these indicators.118 The avoidance of 
references to courts and lawyers, arguably, is only textual. As long as 
the Index functions as a technology of power119 whose language is 
principally audible to the state and a handful of lawyers and 
technocrats, courts and lawyers will remain the only speakers in the 
broad dialogues of society. 
Contemporary efforts to understand the rule of law through manuals 
and measurement tools attempt a technical-scientific approach to the 
governance of postcolonial societies. These efforts place courts and 
lawyers at the heart of building and governing the institutions of the 
114 David Nelken, Contesting Global Indicators, in THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: 
MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW 317, 318–19 (Sally Engle 
Merry et al. eds., 2015). 
115 Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 HAGUE J. RULE L. 269, 271 
(2011). 
116 See Rajah, supra note 103, at 337. 
117 Marits Barendrecht, Rule of Law Measuring and Accountability: Problems to Be 
Solved Bottom Up, 3 HAGUE J. RULE L. 281, 290 (2011). 
118 Juan Carlos Botero et al., How, When, and Why Do Governance, Justice and Rule of 
Law Indicators Fail Public Policy Decision Making in Practice?, 8 HAGUE J. RULE L. 51, 
67 (2016). 
119 See generally Serban, supra note 113, at 110. 
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state. In the Fullerian sense, that the law is social architecture, Martin 
Krygier observes that rule of law promotion in the Global South usually 
approaches the task “as though establishing [rule of law] where it has 
not existed.”120 
The reality is quite the opposite. Manuals and measures obsess about 
access to justice that starts from practice to build theories of the rule of 
law. Such theories justify continued intervention in the Global South. 
In the process, they not only conflate important conceptual distinctions, 
but also pare down due process and the rule of law into the rather 
parsimonious notion of access to justice. Devika Hovell suggests that 
the reverse is more appropriate—that is, to work from theory to practice 
with a view towards the provision of “strong and enduring theoretical 
foundations to support institutional practice.”121 Such an approach rids 
rule of law promotion of its dependence on state institutions and 
enables it to squarely address the issue of those who have long been 
excluded from societal dialogue. 
CONCLUSION: 
GENERATING RESISTANCE 
My attempt to explore due process of law as a dialogue between ruler 
and ruled in this Article has taken me to a specific narrative of its 
colonial genesis in the Philippines. I make no pretense about the utility 
of this narrative for other postcolonial societies. Rather, what I sought 
to draw attention to is how development interventions, from 
imperialism to rule of law promotion, held—and continue to hold—the 
postcolonial state’s myth captive to a procedural-adjudicatory 
imaginary of due process of law. This exploration was undertaken to 
expose the conceptual distortions that the Westphalian state-form 
introduced to due process of law,122 and which are kept in place by 
efforts to promote the rule of law in the Global South. The exercise of 
going back to the promise of due process of law—that is, of inclusion 
within the larger contestations about collective decisions of 
consequence to human life—requires corresponding efforts to resist 
token dialogue maintained by rule of law promotion from the Global 
North. 
120 Krygier, supra note 6, at 161. 
121 DEVIKA HOVELL, THE POWER OF PROCESS: THE VALUE OF DUE PROCESS IN 
SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS DECISION-MAKING 163 (2016). 
122 See generally Paul Burgess, Neglecting the History of the Rule of Law: (Unintended) 
Conceptual Eugenics, 9 HAGUE J. RULE L. 195 (2017). 
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Rule of law promotion’s relatively recent turn to informal justice 
systems overtly expands its normative agenda. Yet, at the same time, it 
harbors covert universalist fantasies fueled by the very same, albeit 
discredited, impulse to dominate, subjugate, and exclude. 
Imagined as a dialogue, due process demythologizes matters of 
procedure and access to justice to enable its participants to speak, 
articulate, and even object to collective decisions that would affect their 
lives. It prevents the ritualistic reduction of speakers into mere items to 
be ticked off a laundry list of prerequisites that must be met to receive 
development aid or foreign direct investment, to be admitted to 
international organizations, or simply, to be taken seriously. Due 
process of law, conceived as a form of resistance, diverts attention from 
the outcome of rote compliance with legal procedure into fostering 
avenues of objection to state actions that do not, in legal terms, 
“deprive.” Imagining what resistance might entail in concrete terms at 
present is difficult because of the ideational supremacy of the state as 
the organizing logic of humanity since 1648. Still, I urge the reader to 
recall that it was once possible to seamlessly participate in the broad 
dialogues that determine the rules of and in society because of, and 
perhaps not despite, the absence of prescriptive interventions that 
ordain normative predictability, uniformity, and stability at the expense 
of human differences. 
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